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Abstract
We present a quantum approach to a signaling game; a special kind of extensive games of incomplete
information. Our model is based on quantum schemes for games in strategic form where players perform
unitary operators on their own qubits of some fixed initial state and the payoff function is given by
a measurement on the resulting final state. We show that the quantum game induced by our scheme
coincides with a signaling game as a special case and outputs nonclassical results in general. As an
example, we consider a quantum extension of the signaling game in which the chance move is a three-
parameter unitary operator whereas the players’ actions are equivalent to classical ones. In this case, we
study the game in terms of Nash equilibria and refine the pure Nash equilibria adapting to the quantum
game the notion of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The fifteen-year period of the development of quantum games has brought some of the ideas that tell us
how special extensive form games might be played in the quantum domain, for example, the quantum
model of Stackelberg duopoly [1] or games with multiple rounds [2]. However, the previous results do
not explain (even in a simple two-stage quantum game) how to identify behavioral strategies, information
sets and other terms connected with extensive game theory. In our recent papers [3, 4] we have proposed
a way of quantizing extensive games without chance moves through their normal representation which
covers not only two-stage extensive games but also more complex games, including games with imperfect
information. In this paper, with the use of a signaling game, we generalize our idea by allowing a chance
mover to perform a quantum operation.
The key feature of our research is the study of the extensive structure of the quantum scheme so that we
are able to introduce the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium–a Nash equilibrium refinement for games
of incomplete information. For convenience, we consider the case where the chance mover and the players
are equipped with unitary operations. Thus, we assume that the only interaction with the environment is by
a quantum measurement. Certainly, a more general scheme could be constructed. According to [5, 6], the
most natural generalization is to allow the players to use general quantum operations, i.e., trace-preserving,
completely-positive maps. Our aim is not to construct the most general scheme but to show that quantum
game theory can be developed by applying advanced terms from classical game theory.
To make the paper self-contained, we begin with recalling the notion of a signaling game and perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
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Figure 1: A signaling game.
2 Signaling game
The signaling game that we are going to study was introduced by In-Koo Cho and David M Kreps in [7].
The game begins with a chance move that determines the type of player 1. After player 1 is informed about
her type, she chooses her action. Then player 2 observes this action and moves next. The extensive form of
such a game is illustrated in figure 1.
In this game each player has got two information sets–points of the game that describe the player’s
knowledge about previous actions chosen in the game. Player 1’s information sets are represented by single
nodes t1 and t2 since player 1 knows exactly her type. On the other hand, player 2’s information sets are
determined by the actions of player 1. They are represented by the nodes connected by dashed lines that
follow player 1’s actions. These information sets point out that player 2 learns about an action chosen by
player 1. She does not know, however, the type of player 1. This lack of knowledge is a key feature of a
signaling game. The only way for player 2 to find out player 1’ type is to analyse her chosen actions that
might be a signal about this type.
Solution concepts for a signaling game One of the most commonly used solution concepts for nonco-
operative games is a Nash equilibrium [8] (see also [9]). It is a strategy profile such that no player gains by
unilateral deviation from the equilibrium strategy. The formal definition of a pure Nash equilibrium for a
game in strategic form is as follows.
Let (N, {S i}i∈N, {ui}i∈N) be a game in strategic form, where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ∈ N is the set of players,
S i is the set of strategies of player i ∈ N and ui : S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n → R is the payoff function of player i
that assigns for every strategy profile (s1, s2, . . . , sn) payoff ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn).
Definition 1 A profile of strategies (s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗n) is a pure Nash equilibrium in a strategic game
(N, {S i}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) if for each player i ∈ N and for all si ∈ S i
ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), where s∗−i = (s∗1, . . . , s∗i−1, s∗i+1, . . . , s∗n). (1)
A Nash equilibrium is treated as a necessary condition for a strategy profile to be a reasonable solution
of any noncooperative game and it may be very useful for determining a probable outcome of a strategic
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game if the number of Nash equilibria is quite low. However, the significance of a Nash equilibrium may
decline if one considers a game in extensive form. An extensive game may have a lot of Nash equilibria
and/or some of the Nash equilibria may include actions which are not optimal off the equilibrium path (see
for example [9, 10]). As an example, let us consider an extensive game in figure 1 with p = 12 . One way to
find pure Nash equilibria in this game is first to determine its normal form. It is a strategic game defined by
the number of players, all the possible strategies of the extensive game and the payoffs corresponding to the
strategy profiles. We recall that a player’s strategy in an extensive game is a function assigning an action to
each information set of the player. As a result, the normal form with p = 12 is as follows:

uu ud du dd
LL (6, 6) (6, 6) (5, 1) (5, 1)
LR (5, 7) (6, 6) (4, 1) (5, 0)
RL (8, 4) (6, 1) (8, 5) (6, 2)
RR (7, 5) (6, 1) (7, 5) (6, 1)
, (2)
where, for example, strategy LR means that player 1 plays action L at her first information set and R at the
second one, and uu means that player 2 chooses action u at both her information sets. Using the system
of inequalities (1), pure Nash equilibria in (2) are then (RL, du) and (LL, ud). Although it might seem that
these two equilibria are equally likely scenarios of the game, it is supposed that equilibrium strategy ud will
not be chosen by a rational player. It follows from non-optimal action d off the equilibrium path. Indeed,
note that action d is strictly dominated by action u at the right information set of player 2, i.e., it always
gives a worse outcome than action u at this information set. Thus, in case player 2 specifies her action at
the right information set, she ought to choose u instead.
Equilibrium refinements can exclude Nash equilibria containing non-optimal actions. For the signaling
game it is sufficient to consider a (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where, for our needs, we restrict
ourselves to pure strategies. Following Kreps and Wilson [11], let us first define an assessment to be a pair
(s, µ) of a pure strategy profile s and a belief system µ, i.e., a map that assigns to each information set a
probability distribution over the nodes of this information set. Thus, in our example in figure (1), player
2’s beliefs are probability distributions (b1, 1 − b1) and (b2, 1 − b2). In turn, player 1’s beliefs assign to her
decision nodes a probability equal to 1. Now, for any node x from an information set h let P(x) denote the
probability that x is reached given s and chance moves, if any.
Definition 2 An assessment (s, µ) is Bayesian consistent if belief µ(x) at node x is equal to P(x)/∑x∈h P(x)
for all h for which ∑x∈h P(x) > 0 and all x ∈ h.
Denote by ui(a|s, x) the expected payoff of player i from playing action a, conditional on being at node x
and strategy profile s. Then, ∑x∈h µ(x)ui(a|s, x) is the expected payoff of player i from playing the action a,
conditional on being at information set h.
Definition 3 An assessment (s, µ) in an extensive game is sequentially rational if for each player i ∈ N,
each information set h of this player and action a from the set A(h) of available actions at h, if a is consistent
with si then ∑
x∈h
µ(x)ui(a|s, x) = max
a′∈A(h)
∑
x∈h
µ(x)ui(a′|s, x). (3)
In other words, condition (3) requires for each player i that action a prescribed by strategy si is optimal
given s = (si)i∈N and beliefs µ. The two definitions above allow one to formulate the following equilibrium
refinement:
Definition 4 An assessment (s, µ) in an extensive game is a (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is
sequentially rational and Bayesian consistent.
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Let us consider, for example, Nash equilibrium (LL, ud) with a view to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
If probability distribution (p, 1− p) = (1/2, 1/2) determines the chance moves, the Bayesian consistency on
player 2’s beliefs requires b1 = 1/2 whereas beliefs (b2, 1−b2) are not forced by the consistency requirement.
In this case action u at the left information set is optimal. However, given arbitrary beliefs (b2, 1−b2), action
d at the right information set gives player 2 a lower payoff than action u. As a consequence, the profile
(LL, ud) is not a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A similar analysis would show that the profile (RL, du)
together with player 2’ beliefs b1 = 0 and b2 = 1 satisfies Bayesian consistency and sequential rationality.
3 Quantum model for a signaling game
In paper [4] we introduced a model for describing extensive games, where we focused on the normal form
and studied Nash equilibria in the resulting quantum game. Here, we are going to justify our scheme with
respect to the dynamic nature of an extensive game.
Motivation for the model construction Let us consider the generalized Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL)
quantum approach to an n-player strategic game with two-element strategy sets [5] (we encourage readers
who are not familiar with the EWL scheme to first see [12]). According to an alternative notation for the
EWL scheme introduced in [13] and generalized in [5], the quantum protocol is defined by 4-tuple
{H , |Ψin〉,SU(2), {Mi}i∈{1,2,...,n}} , (4)
where the components specify the game in the following way:
• H is a Hilbert space (C2)⊗n with basis {|Ψx1x2 ...xn〉}x1 ,x2 ,...,xn∈{0,1} defined for all (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n
by the formula
|Ψx1 x2...xn〉 =
|x1x2 . . . xn〉 + i|x1x2 . . . xn〉√
2
, (5)
where xi is the negation of xi.
• |Ψin〉 is called the initial state, and |Ψin〉 = |Ψ00...0〉.
• SU(2) defines the unitary operators available for each player. The matrix representation of the opera-
tors from SU(2) (with respect to the computational basis) can be written as follows:
Ui(θi, αi, βi) =
(
eiαi cos θi2 ie
iβi sin θi2
ie−iβi sin θi2 e
−iαi cos θi2
)
. (6)
• Mi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is an observable given by the formula
Mi =
∑
x1 ,x2,...,xn∈{0,1}
mix1 x2 ...xn |Ψx1 x2 ...xn〉〈Ψx1 x2 ...xn |. (7)
The measurement is performed on the final state |Ψf〉 =
⊗n
i=1 Ui(θi, αi, βi)|Ψin〉. The possible out-
comes mix1 x2 ...xn ∈ R of the measurement correspond to player i’s payoffs.
It turns out that we can adapt scheme (4) for any extensive game with two actions at each information set.
Since operators Ui(θi, 0, 0) represent classical moves in the EWL scheme for a 2 × 2 bimatrix game, it is
natural to assume that they correspond to classical moves in any quantum game defined by the generalized
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scheme. The argumentation is as follows. The final state |Ψf〉 after each player performs her unitary operator
Ui(θi, 0, 0) is as follows:
|Ψf〉 =
n⊗
i=1
Ui(θi, 0, 0)|Ψin〉
=
n⊗
i=1
(
cos
θi
2
|0〉 + i sin θi
2
|1〉
)
+ i
n⊗
i=1
(
i sin θi
2
|0〉 + cos θi
2
|1〉
)
=
∑
x1 ,x2 ,...,xn∈{0,1}
i
∑n
j=1 x j cos
(
x1pi − θ1
2
)
· · · cos
(
xnpi − θn
2
)
|Ψx1,...,xn〉. (8)
Let us denote by xi ∈ {0i, 1i} an action at the ith information set and by
Pxi ≔
∑
xk∈{0,1},k,i
|Ψx1 x2...xn〉〈Ψx1 x2 ...xn |
Pxi x j ≔
∑
xk∈{0,1},k,i, j
|Ψx1x2 ...xn〉〈Ψx1x2 ...xn |
...
Px1 x2 ...xn ≔ |Ψx1 x2...xn〉〈Ψx1 x2 ...xn |
(9)
the projectors onto the respective subspaces of (C2)⊗n. Let us assign to each action xi projection Pxi of
the state vector |Ψf〉. Then, 〈Ψf |P0i |Ψf〉 = cos2 θi2 and 〈Ψf |P1i |Ψf〉 = sin2 θi2 . Taking p ≔ cos2 θi2 , we
obtain a probability distribution over the actions equivalent to one given by a classical behavioral strat-
egy b = (p, 1 − p). Thus, in particular, Ui(0, 0, 0) and Ui(pi, 0, 0) represent pure actions. In general, let
us assign to a sequence of actions xi1 , xi1 , . . . , xik the product of projections
∏k
j=1 Pxi j = Pxi1 xi1 ...xik . Then
〈Ψf |Pxi1 xi1 ...xik |Ψf〉 =
∏k
j=1 cos
2 xi jpi−θi j
2 and this corresponds to the product of probabilities given by applying
a sequence (bi j) of classical behavioral strategies bi j =
(
cos2
θi j
2 , sin
2 θi j
2
)
at the i jth information set, where
j = 1, . . . , k.
As a result, we have obtained the procedure how to describe an extensive game in terms of the math-
ematical methods of quantum information. At the same time, we have obtained a scheme that places an
extensive game in quantum domain whenever the set of unitary operators of at least one player is SU(2).
Quantum model A detailed description of the quantum scheme for a game in figure 1 is as follows. This
is a 6-tuple
(H , N ∪ {C}, |Ψin〉, ξ,SU(2), {Mi}i∈N) , (10)
where
• components H and |Ψin〉 are the special case of those from (4) for a Hilbert space (C2)⊗5;
• N = {1, 2} is a set of players and C is a chance mover;
• SU(2) specifies the players’ and the chance mover’s actions. It is assumed that a unitary operation
performed by the chance mover is known to the players;
• ξ is a map that relates qubits to players and the chance mover. It is a map ξ : {1, 2, . . . , 5} → N ∪ {C}
given by formula
ξ( j) =

C if j = 1
1 if j ∈ {2, 3}
2 if j ∈ {4, 5},
(11)
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Figure 2: Projective measurements corresponding to particular game nodes.
that assigns to each index j ∈ {1, . . . , 5} of x j in |Ψx1 x2x3 x4 x5〉 a player or the chance mover;
• Mi is an observable that describes a measurement on the final state |Ψf〉,
Mi = mi1P010204 + m
i
2P010214 + m
i
3P110304 + m
i
4P110314
+ mi5P011205 + m
i
6P011215 + m
i
7P111305 + m
i
8P111315 (12)
Then the average value Ei of measurement Mi,
Ei = 〈Ψf |Mi|Ψf〉 for |Ψf〉 =
5⊗
i=1
Ui(θi, αi, βi)|Ψ00000〉 (13)
determines a payoff for player i ∈ N.
Thus, the quantum model for the signaling game in figure 1 requires a five-qubit state. The chance mover’s
action is represented by a unitary operation on the first qubit. In turn, a unitary operation U2 ⊗ U3 on
the second and third qubit, and a unitary operation U4 ⊗ U5 on the fourth and fifth one are player 1’s and
player 2’s strategies, respectively. The form of observable (12) is based on our motivation for the scheme
construction. Following this line of thought, and then the link between projections and actions as it is given
in figure 2, each term in Mi corresponds to measurement that the state of the game is in the respective end
node.
4 A signaling game with a quantum chance mover
In the literature of quantum games one can find many examples that show the advantages of quantum
strategies over classical ones. The same could be done for the quantum signaling game if, for example, one
player’s strategy set were extended to the full range of unitary operators. We are going to consider another
case where the players’ actions are still classical ones, i.e., they are in the form of U(θ, 0, 0), and the full
set SU(2) is available only for the chance mover. In this case, we obtain an interesting example, where the
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normal form of the resulting quantum game has the same dimension as the classical game. As it is shown
below, this feature makes the classical and quantum game easy to compare. Moreover, the fact that the
players are equipped with operators U(θ, 0, 0) enables us, easily, to refine Nash equilibria in the quantum
game by using the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
More precisely, let us consider 6-tuple (10) in which the set SU(2) is available only for the chance
mover, and the players are equipped with the set {U(θ) ≔ U(θ, 0, 0) : θ ∈ [0, pi]}. The possible measurement
Mi’s outcomes mij, for j = 1, . . . , 8 of measurement Mi correspond to payoffs from the game in figure (1),
i.e.,
(m11,m22) = (6, 12) (m12,m22) = (4, 0) (m13,m23) = (6, 0) (m14,m24) = (6, 2);
(m15,m25) = (10, 8) (m16,m26) = (6, 2) (m17,m27) = (4, 2) (m18,m28) = (6, 0).
(14)
Let us assume that the chance mover specifies U1(pi/2, pi/6, pi/3) as her move. We recall that a chance
mover’s action U1(pi/2, 0, 0) corresponds to probability distribution (1/2, 1/2) over her classical actions and
non zero coordinates α1 and β1 in U1(θ1, α1, β1) place the game into the quantum domain. The final state
after the first and second player specify U2(θ2) ⊗ U3(θ3) and U(θ4) ⊗ U(θ5), respectively, is in the form
|Ψf〉 =
(
U1
(
pi
2
,
pi
6 ,
pi
3
)
⊗ U2(θ2) ⊗ U3(θ3) ⊗ U4(θ4) ⊗ U5(θ5)
)
|Ψ00000〉. (15)
Let us calculate the expected values E1 and E2 for each (θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5) ∈ {0, pi}4; values corresponding to pure
strategy profiles. For example, quadruple (0, 0, pi, pi) implies the following final state:
|Ψf〉 = −
√
6
4
|Ψ00011〉 −
√
2
4
|Ψ11100〉 −
√
2i
4
|Ψ10011〉 +
√
6i
4
|Ψ01100〉. (16)
Then, the pair (〈Ψf |M1|Ψf〉, 〈Ψf |M2|Ψf〉) equals (6.5, 3.5). By calculating the average values of measure-
ments M1 and M2 for the other quadruples we obtain the following bimatrix:

U4(0) ⊗ U5(0) U4(0) ⊗ U5(pi) U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0) U4(pi) ⊗ U5(pi)
U2(0) ⊗ U3(0) (6, 5.25) (7.25, 7.75) (5.25, 1) (6.5, 3.5)
U2(0) ⊗ U3(pi) (5.75, 5.75) (7.5, 7.75) (5, 1) (6.75, 3)
U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0) (6.75, 3) (5, 1) (7.5, 7.75) (5.75, 5.75)
U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0) (6.5, 3.5) (5.25, 1) (7.25, 7.75) (6, 5.25)
. (17)
As a result, quantum scheme (10) provides the players with a quite different bimatrix compared with (2).
In particular, the classical game and the quantum counterpart have two pure Nash equilibria but differ in
payoff outcomes. Indeed, in contrast to the classical case, profiles ((U2(0) ⊗ U3(pi)), (U4(0) ⊗ U5(pi))) and((U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0)), (U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0))) are Nash equilibria with the same payoff outcome (7.5, 7.75).
Perfect Bayesian-type equilibria Let us study profile ((U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0)), (U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0))). According to
definition 1, no player gains by unilaterally deviating from unitary operator U(pi) ⊗ U(0). It turns out that
it can be said more about the profile in terms of Bayesian consistency and sequential rationality. First, let
us carry out perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis for player 1. Following figure 2, the probability that the
game reaches the upper node given chance move U1(pi/2, pi/6, pi/3) and player 2’s strategy (U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0))
equals 〈Ψ1|P0|Ψ1〉 = 3/4 where
|Ψ1〉 =
(
U1
(
pi
2
,
pi
6 ,
pi
3
)
⊗ 1 ⊗ 1 ⊗ U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0)
)
|Ψ00000〉
=
√
6i
4
|Ψ00010〉 +
√
2i
4
|Ψ11101〉 −
√
2
4
|Ψ10010〉 +
√
6
4
|Ψ01101〉, (18)
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and 1 means the identity operator on C2. Since player 1’s information sets are singletons, reaching the
upper node is equivalent to reaching the corresponding information set, so her belief of being at the upper
node attaches probability 1 to this node. Therefore, after player 1 learns that the state of the chance mover’s
qubit corresponds to P01 , she believes that with probability 1 faces the following state:
|Ψ′1〉 =
P01 |Ψ1〉√〈Ψ1|P01 |Ψ1〉 =
√
2i
2
|Ψ00010〉 +
√
2
2
|Ψ01101〉. (19)
Denote by |Ψ′′1 〉 the state obtained when player 1 performs unitary strategy U2(θ2) ⊗ U3(θ3) on |Ψ′1〉. Then
|Ψ′′〉 = (1 ⊗ U2(θ2) ⊗ U3(θ3) ⊗ 1 ⊗ 1)|Ψ′1〉
=
√
2
2
∑
x2 ,x3∈{0.1}
ix2+x3c(x2, x3)(i|Ψ0x2x310〉 + |Ψ0x2x301〉), (20)
where c(x2, x3) = cos
(
x2pi−θ2
2
)
cos
(
x3pi−θ3
2
)
. Then, U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0) is optimal given the belief (19) about the
quantum state if
U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0) ∈ argmax
U2(θ2)⊗U3(θ3)
〈Ψ′′1 |M1|Ψ′′1 〉. (21)
Indeed,
max
U2(θ2)⊗U3(θ3)
〈Ψ′′1 |M1|Ψ′′1 〉 = maxU2(θ2)
(
8 − 3 cos2 θ2
2
)
= 8. (22)
Thus, condition (21) is satisfied.
Similar computation for the case when player 1 learns that the state of the chance mover’s qubit corre-
sponds to P11 proves that U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0) is also optimal on state
P11 |Ψ1〉√〈Ψ1|P11 |Ψ1〉 =
√
2i
2
|Ψ11101〉 −
√
2
2
|Ψ10010〉. (23)
As a result, player 1’s strategy U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0) is sequentially-type rational given her beliefs.
Let us consider now player 2’s strategy U4(pi)⊗U5(0) in the terms of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The
state after the chance mover and player 1 use operators U1
(
pi
2 ,
pi
6 ,
pi
3
)
and U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0), respectively, is as
follows
|Ψ2〉 =
(
U1
(
pi
2
,
pi
6 ,
pi
3
)
⊗ U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0) ⊗ 1 ⊗ 1
)
|Ψ00000〉
=
√
6i
4
|Ψ01000〉 +
√
2i
4
|Ψ10111〉 −
√
2
4
|Ψ11000〉 +
√
6
4
|Ψ00111〉. (24)
Then the probability that the left information set is reached is equal to 〈Ψ2|P0102 |Ψ2〉 + 〈Ψ2|P1103 |Ψ2〉 = 1/2.
By Bayesian consistency, player 2’s beliefs of being at the upper and lower node at the left information set
are 〈Ψ2|P0102 |Ψ2〉
〈Ψ2|P0102 |Ψ2〉 + 〈Ψ2|P1103 |Ψ2〉
=
3
4
and
〈Ψ2|P1103 |Ψ2〉
〈Ψ2|P0102 |Ψ2〉 + 〈Ψ2|P1103 |Ψ2〉
=
1
4
. (25)
As a consequence, specifying her beliefs, player 2 faces post-measurement state P0102 |Ψ2〉/
√〈Ψ2|P0102 |Ψ2〉 =
|Ψ00111〉 with probability 3/4, and state P1103 |Ψ2〉/
√〈Ψ2|P1103 |Ψ2〉 = −|Ψ11000〉 with probability 1/4. In other
words, player 2 is faced with the following mixed state
ρ2 =
3
4
|Ψ00111〉〈Ψ00111| +
1
4
|Ψ11000〉〈Ψ11000|. (26)
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Thus, mixed state (26) after player 2 uses her unitary operator U4(θ4) ⊗ U5(θ5) takes the form
ρ′2 =
(
1
⊗3 ⊗ U4(θ4) ⊗ U5(θ5)
)
ρ2
(
1
⊗3 ⊗ U4(θ4) ⊗ U5(θ5)
)† (27)
and player 2’s expected payoff is given by tr(ρ′2M2). In order to prove that, given her beliefs, U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0)
is optimal for player 2 let us determine argmaxU4(θ4)⊗U5(θ5) tr(ρ′2M2),
argmax
U4(θ4)⊗U5(θ5)
tr(ρ′2M2)
= argmax
U4(θ4)⊗U5(θ5)
tr

∑
x4 ,x5∈{0,1}
c2(x4, x5)
(
3
4
|Ψ001x4x5〉〈Ψ001x4x5 | +
1
4
|Ψ110x4 x5〉〈Ψ110x4 x5 |
)
= argmax
U4(θ4)⊗U5(θ5)
19
2
sin θ4
2
= {pi} × [0, pi]. (28)
Result (28) shows that U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0) is also sequentially-type rational given player 2’s beliefs at the left
information set. In a similar way, we can prove sequential-type rationality of U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0) at the right
information set.
As a result, strategy profile ((U2(pi) ⊗ U3(0)), (U4(pi) ⊗ U5(0))) consists of strategies that are optimal
with respect to unilateral deviation in both cases: when only the payoff measuerment is performed (a Nash
equilibrium) and when a player performs the additional measurement before her move (sequential rational-
ity). It can be shown that the other pure equilibrium given by bimatrix (17) is also a perfect Bayesian-type
equilibrium.
5 Conclusion and further research
The purpose of the research was to translate signaling games into the formalism of quantum information
and to examine how playing the game would then change. We showed that there exists a quantum approach
to a signaling game that constitutes a generalization of the classical game. In particular, we proved (with
the use of Eisert et al quantum scheme for strategic games) that the special one-parameter unitary strategies
are equivalent to classical moves in the game and a broader range of unitary operators affects the game.
The key result of our work was to show that optimal strategy analysis in quantum games can go beyond
the concept of Nash equilibrium. A player measuring the state after the other players operate but before
her move gives rise to a new solution concept in quantum games that can be treated as a counterpart of a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in classical game theory. It is worth noting that there is more than one way
to define a quantum counterpart of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consistent with the classical term. For
example, when solving optimization problems (21) and (28) it does not matter whether we maximize over
U2(θ2) ⊗ U3(θ3) and U4(θ4) ⊗ U4(θ4) or over U2(θ2) and U4(θ). However, it may have great importance
when the full set of unitary operators is also available for players and may constitute independent subject of
research. Another interesting problem would be to specify how the players’ strategic positions change when
one or both players are provided with the set SU(2). In particular, studying player 2’ position in the game
seems significant. In the classical game, she is deprived of knowing the type of player 1 and we suppose
that the access to quantum strategies may improve player 2’ strategic position. Finally, one may investigate
the relation between Nash equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We suppose that, in contrast to
the classical case, the perfect Bayesian conditions in the way we have presented in the paper may not imply
Nash equilibrium. This would point out another distinction between classical and quantum game theory.
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